Журнал: Управление наукой: теория и практикаТамбовцев В. Л.Исследовательское поведение: ограниченно рациональное производство рационального научного знания

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Журнал: Управление наукой: теория и практика

Тамбовцев В. Л.

Исследовательское поведение: ограниченно рациональное производство рационального научного знания

DOI: https://doi.org/10.19181/smtp.2023.5.1.11
Тамбовцев Виталий Леонидович
МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова, Москва, Россия
Доктор экономических наук, профессор

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Тамбовцев В. Л. Исследовательское поведение: ограниченно рациональное производство рационального научного знания // Управление наукой: теория и практика. 2023. Том. 5. № 1. С. 185-203.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.19181/smtp.2023.5.1.11. EDN: SCMTFF

Рубрика:

Культурно-исторический контекст и стратегии научно-технологического развития

Аннотация:

Люди сильно разнятся между собой по познавательным способностям, однако у всех них эти способности ограничены, начиная от возможностей восприятия окружающей реальности и кончая осуществлением математических расчётов и логических выводов из сделанных посылок. Если полностью рациональный индивид не только обладает полной информацией о мире, но и неограниченными возможностями совершать расчёты и делать логические выводы, то реальные люди, включая профессиональных исследователей, лишь ограниченно рациональны. Тем не менее научные знания, производимые учёными, близки к полностью рациональным. В статье рассматриваются компоненты ограниченной рациональности и те механизмы внутри науки, которые позволяют совершать такой переход. Ведущая роль среди этих механизмов принадлежит научной коммуникации, одной из функций которой является коррекция непроизвольных и неосознаваемых ошибок, совершаемых ограниченно рациональными исследователями. Показано, что выполнение этой функции сталкивается с определёнными сложностями, которые важно исследовать для улучшения процесса корректировки ошибок.

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